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Abstract The EU grants preferential access to its imports from developing 
countries under several trade agreements. The  widest arrangement, in terms of 
country and product coverage, is the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) 
through which, since 1971, virtually all developing countries have received 
preferential treatment when exporting to world markets. This paper evaluates 
the impact of GSP in enhancing developing countries’ exports to EU markets. It 
is based on the estimation of a gravity model for a sample of 769 products 
exported from 169 countries to EU over the period 2001-2004. While, from an 
econometric point of view, the estimation methods take into account 
unobservable country heterogeneity as well as the potential selection bias which 
zero-trade values pose, the empirical setting considers an explicit measure of 
trade preferences, the margin of preferences. The analysis offers new empirical 
evidence that the impact of GSP on developing countries’ agricultural exports to 
the EU is positive. 
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I.  Introduction 
The EU plays a crucial role in promoting sustainable growth in developing countries (DCs) 
because it is one of the most important actors in international trade (accounting for about one 
fifth of all world trade). Its trade policy may influence DCs’ economic growth in many ways, eg. 
by enhancing production and export earnings and encouraging diversification in their economies. 
One of the classical instruments for achieving these objectives is to offer preferential trade terms 
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in favour of DC exports, through which the EU provides incentives to traders to import products 
from preferred DCs and, thus, help them to compete in international markets.  
An important preferential trade agreement (PTA) adopted by the EU is the Generalised 
System of Preferences (GSP), which is a set of unilateral trade concessions exclusively granted 
to DCs. It is a multiregional PTA covering numerous criteria of eligibility and a certain 
differentiation among developing countries in the application of preferential treatment. The EU 
GSP dates back to 1968 when the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) recommended the creation of a ‘Generalised System of Tariff Preferences’ under 
which developed countries would grant trade preferences to all DCs. It was adopted by the EU in 
1971 for a period of ten years and has been renewed several times, with revisions involving 
product coverage, quotas, ceilings and their administration, as well as the lists of beneficiaries 
and of tariff cuts for agricultural products. 
The impact of the EU GSP has been analysed in some detail and much research has been 
conducted using the gravity model. This approach posits that export flows are positively 
influenced by the economic masses of trading countries, negatively influenced by the distance 
between them (Tinbergen, 1962) and, within this analytical framework, that preferential 
treatment extended to exporters will increase their exports to the preference-giving countries. 
This is because countries which benefit from GSP tariff reductions face more favourable access 
to EU markets than do exporters who are not eligible for GSP support. Looking at the gravity 
empirics, the main outcome is that the EU GSP does not achieve its objectives in terms of 
enhancing the export flows of beneficiaries towards EU markets (see, Agostino et al., 2008; 
Cardamone 2009; Cipollina and Salvatici, 2007; Nilsson, 2002; Persson, 2005;  Persson and 
Wilhelmsonn, 2007; Pishbahar and Huchet-Bourdon, 2009; Subramanian and Wei, 2007; 
Verdeja, 2006). This is mainly due to the size of the trade preferences, to the high administrative 
costs, the restrictive Rules of Origin (RoO) and other conditions that undermine the full potential 
of the preferential treatment.
1  
While the EU GSP has received a great deal of attention, research has focused on the 
impact on total trade mainly by using the dummy variable approach to measure the effect of the 
preferential treatment. In other words, assessment of the trade effects induced by the GSP has 
rarely been made by referring to sectoral data and by exploiting data on tariffs which would 
allow precise gauging of the margin of preferences enjoyed by DCs.   
                                                 
1 The GSP is governed by strict RoO to ensure that benefits only go to the GSP countries. In fact, 
products originate in a country if they were wholly obtained in the country or sufficiently worked upon 
or processed within it. However, cumulation rules enable production processes to take place in certain 
other countries without affecting the exporter’s entitlement to GSP benefits.      3 
 
This paper attempts to fill this gap in the literature by providing new empirical evidence 
of the impact of the EU GSP, the evaluation of which is based on the estimation of a gravity 
model using trade data at a very high level of disaggregation. With respect to the related 
literature on the impact of the EU GSP, the distinguishing features of the study are threefold.  
Firstly, as far as the measure of preferential trade treatment is concerned, instead of 
considering a dummy variable, we use an explicit measure of the preferential treatment granted 
by the EU to the exports of DCs involved in a trade agreements (GSP, Cotonou Agreement, 
European Mediterranean Agreements). This measure is defined as the ratio between the margin 
of preference and the Most-Favoured Nation (MFN) duty, where the margin of preference is the 
difference between the MFN tariff and the preferential tariff to be applied, under a given trade 
agreement, to any specific trade flow.   
Secondly, we shall focus on agricultural exports using disaggregated data at HS6-digit 
level.
2 To be more precise, we shall analyse the export flows towards EU markets of 763 
products at HS6-digit level related to twelve groups of agricultural products
3 over the period 
2001-2004. This choice is due to the fact that trade preferences granted to DCs are substantial for 
agricultural exports, whereas the trade restrictions applied by the EU to its non-agricultural 
imports are modest. Furthermore, by using the sectoral data, we intend to limit the aggregation 
bias which characterises, for instance, the indicators meant to reveal the trade protection of all 
imports (Anderson and Neary, 2005; Cipollina and Salvatici, 2008). Finally, GSP trade 
preferences, like those of any other trade agreement, are conceived of as being applied at product 
level and are extremely heterogonous across products. Therefore, it seems reasonable to evaluate 
their impact at disaggregated level. The econometric analysis is carried out by pooling the data 
for all HS6-digit agricultural products and by running a regression, using data at HS6-digit level, 
for each of the twelve agricultural sectors covered by the study (cfr footnote 3). 
Thirdly, the methods used in the estimations deal with several issues which are common 
when considering a gravity equation to analyse trade flows. Indeed, we shall use a fixed effect 
model to check for country non-observable heterogeneity. Again, following the method adopted 
by many authors (Burger et al., 2009; Helpman et al., 2007; Linders and de Groot, 2006; Martin 
and Pham, 2008; Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006), we shall apply a Poisson family model and 
                                                 
2 The Harmonized System (HS) is an internationally standardised nomenclature for the description, 
classification and coding of goods. It consists of around 1,200 4-digit headings and 5,000 6-digit 
subheadings, which are organised into 21 Sections and 97 Chapters. The HS covers all goods in 
international trade. 
 
3 The twelve HS2-digit agricultural products included in the analysis are the following: live animals, 
fisheries, fruits, lacs and gums, oils and fats, products of animal origin, sugar, vegetables, beverages 
and spirits, tobacco, tropical fruits and residues of the food industry.      4 
 
its extensions, Zero Inflated Poissoin (ZIP) and Negative Binomial Regression (NBR), in order 
to overcome the problems posed by zero-trade flows, the frequency of which is severe when a 
study is based on disaggregated data. These procedures consider the non-multiplicative form of 
the gravity equation and lead to more reliable results than do estimations based on the log-linear 
specification of the model carried out using the standard methods (i.e., OLS or Fixed Effect 
Models). This is because Poisson, ZIP and NRB estimators take into account zero-trade flows 
and, therefore, can shed light on why countries do not trade with each other.     
The samples on which the econometric section of the present study is based consist of 
169 countries and 763 agricultural product lines at HS6-digit level. The period under 
consideration is 2001- 2004. This choice is brought about by the fact that data on tariffs for such 
a large number of commodities are easily available only from DBTAR (2006).  
The paper is divided into nine sections. The second section describes the GSP scheme; the 
third summarises the literature on the effectiveness of the EU GSP scheme. The fourth section 
presents a descriptive analysis of DC agricultural exports to the EU market, while the fifth 
paragraph gives a breakdown of the preferential tariffs implemented through the EU GSP. The 
sixth section focuses on the gravity equation, whereas section seven deals with the econometric 
methods used to estimate the gravity model, the results of which are discussed in section eight. 
Section nine concludes.  
 
II.  The EU GSP scheme 
Since 1971, when the GSP was initially adopted by the EU, almost all DCs have enjoyed non-
reciprocal preferential trading terms for exporting to the EU market. The first GSP was in force 
for a period of ten years. The 1981 GSP revision involved product coverage, quotas, ceilings and 
their administration, as well as the list of beneficiaries and the tariff cuts for agricultural 
products. From 1981 to 1995, there were no substantial changes in the operating rules of the EU 
GSP, whereas in January 1995 a new 10-year EU GSP scheme was introduced, providing five 
types of arrangement. The ordinary GSP, where about 7,000 products were classified in four 
groups according to the tariff cuts they received, was still the main component of the 
arrangement.
4 Besides the ordinary GSP, the EU implemented a specific arrangement providing 
incentives for the protection of labour rights and another specific agreement to promote 
                                                 
4 There were 3,000 non-sensitive products entering the EU market duty free, whereas the duty applicable 
was 85% of the MFN rate for 3,700 products classified as “very sensitive”. Another group of products 
comprised a sub set of sensitive products which had an applicable duty of 70% of the MFN rate and, 
finally, there was a group of semi-sensitive products, which had an applicable duty of 35% of the MFN 
rate.      5 
 
environmental protection in DCs. Finally, there were the GSP-Drug and the EBA initiatives. The 
GSP-Drug initiative is a special agreement granting preferential treatment to the exports of 
Pakistan and all Central and South American countries belonging to the Andean Community 
with the aim of combatting drug production and its trafficking by enhancing export 
diversification in favour of GSP products,
5 The Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative allowed 
the world’s 49 poorest countries free access for all products except for arms and ammunition.
6  
 Another GSP revision was made on June 2001. This new GSP regulated the preferential 
treatment granted to DCs over the years 2002-2004 and it both simplified and harmonised the 
previous arrangements by, among other things, reducing the number of product categories from 4 
to 2. Duty-free access was maintained for all non sensitive products, while all other goods were 
now classified as sensitive products and benefited from a flat rate reduction of 3.5 percentage 
points of the MFN duty. With the 2006 GSP revision, the EU maintained the ordinary GSP and 
the EBA initiative and launched the GSP-Plus, which was designed to sustain the exports of the 
poorest and most vulnerable countries. To benefit from GSP-Plus, countries must meet a number 
of criteria and must effectively adopt the recommendations of 27 international conventions on 
human and labour rights, environmental protection, good governance and the fight against drugs 
(in this regards it is useful to remember that the GSP-Plus incorporates GSP Drug: from now on 
we will use these two names as synonymous).    
The EBA has remained unchanged. It provides duty-free and quota-free treatment for all 
products originating in LDCs, except for arms and ammunition.   
The most important feature of the new GSP regulations is the graduation mechanism 
according to which preferential tariffs may be either suspended (and then re-established) when 
each country’s exports to EU markets exceed (fall below) a certain threshold over a three-year 
period.
7 Finally, a general rule, which has been applied since 1971, regards the possibility of 
                                                 
5 The eligible countries for the EU GSP-Drug scheme are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Georgia, Guatemala, Honduras, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Sri 
Lanka, Venezuela. 
6 Tariff duties on bananas were reduced by 20% annually as of 1st January, 2002 and they have been 
completely suspended since 1st January, 2009. Tariff duties on rice were reduced by 20% on 1st 
September, 2006, by 50% on 1st September, 2007 and have been completely suspended since 1st 
September, 2009. Finally tariff duties on sugar were reduced by 20% on 1st July, 2006, by 50% on 1st 
July, 2007 and by 80% on 1st July, 2008, and have been completely suspended since 1st July, 2009. 
7 For example, as a result of the graduation mechanism applied to trade statistics covering the years 2004-
2006, GSP preferences will be re-established for Algeria (Mineral products), India (Jewellery, pearls, 
precious metals and stones), Indonesia (Wood and articles of wood), Russia (products of the chemical 
or allied industries and base metals), South Africa (transport equipment) and Thailand (Transport 
equipment), and will be suspended for Vietnam (Footwear, headgear, umbrellas, parasols, artificial 
flowers).      6 
 
removing a country from the scheme. This removal occurs when a country becomes competitive 
in its exporting of a particular product or range of products, when a country is classified as a 
high-income country by the World Bank for three consecutive years, or when exports of the five 
major GSP products account for less than 75 % of total GSP-covered exports to the EU market. 
The current operating rules of GSP were established by regulation 732/2008 which will 
apply until 31st December, 2011. In order to guarantee stability, predictability and transparency 
within the operation of the scheme, the new GSP has not changed the structure or the substance 
of the old scheme and has renewed the ordinary GSP, the GSP-Drug and the EBA initiatives for 
a period of three years. 
As is summarised in table 1, in 2009, the ordinary GSP extended trade preferences to 
6,244 products divided into one group of 3,200 non sensitive products and another group of 
3,044 sensitive products. The first group has duty free access, whereas the sensitive products 
receive, when an ad valorem duty is applied, a tariff cut of 3.5 percentage points with respect to 
the MFN tariff rate (the tariff cut is 20 percentage points for textiles and clothing, 15% for ethyl 
alcohol and 30% when specific duties are applied). The GSP-Drug essentially offers duty free 
access to 6,336 products (table 1) in order to help vulnerable countries in their ratification and 
implementation of relevant international conventions, whereas the EBA initiative provides duty-
free and quota-free access to all products (except for arms and ammunitions) exported by the 49 
LDCs to EU markets. Within each scheme there are 2,405 products which do not enjoy any 
preferential treatment, because the MFN tariffs are already zero. Again within each scheme there 
are products entering the EU at MFN rates (these goods are 919 in the case of the ordinary GSP, 
827 for the GSP-Drug and 23 in the case of EBA) (Table 1). 
Table 1: Products Covered by GSP schemes in 2009 
  Ordinary GSP scheme GSP-Drug  EBA 
Products Covered  6244  6336  7140 
Products with MFN=0 2405  2405  2405 
Products with MFN>0 919  827  23 
Source: EU Commission (2009) 
 
III.  The Literature on the Impact of the EU GSP: a brief review 
There is substantial literature analysing the role of preferential trade agreements (for a review 
see, Nielsen, 2003; Cardamone, 2008) and some of it has specifically evaluated the impact of the 
EU GSP scheme. In reviewing these studies, we have mainly focussed on those papers which use 
the gravitational approach (Agostino et al. 2008; Cardamone 2009; Cipollina and Salvatici 2007;      7 
 
Nilsson 2002; Oguledo and MacPhee 1994; Persson 2005; Persson and Wilhelmsson 2007; 
Pishbahar and Huchet-Bourdon 2009; Sapir 1981; Subramanian and Wei 2007; Verdeja 2006). 
These studies do not converge towards a common result with regards the effectiveness of the 
scheme. However, Sapir (1981), Oguledo and MacPhee (1994), Nilsson (2002), Verdeja, (2006) 
and Agostino et al. (2008) show that the GSP scheme has a positive effect, albeit smaller than 
that of other preferential schemes. 
To be more precise, Sapir (1981) uses yearly cross-sectional OLS regressions of a gravity 
model for the period 1967-1978 to estimate the effect of the GSP scheme on manufactured 
products. He finds that the scheme had a significant and positive effect in 1973 and 1974. 
Oguledo and MacPhee (1994) use a similar method to estimate the effects of the GSP, Lomé, 
EFTA and Mediterranean agreements for 1976. The authors model the preferential treatment of 
the various schemes by using dummy variables which capture the trade diversion effect of 
preferences and import tariffs which gauge the trade creation effect of lower tariffs. Results show 
that GSP preferences have a significant effect on DC exports. Verdeja (2006) analyses whether 
trade preferences granted by the EU through the GSP, the Cotonou Agreement and the Euro-Med 
agreements have been beneficial to Least Developed Countries (LDCs). He considers the period 
1972-2000 and finds that the GSP positively affected the exports of LDCs, although its impact 
was lower than that revealed for the trade preferences granted by the EU to the African, 
Caribbean and Pacific countries (ACPs) which signed the Cotonou agreement. Similar results are 
provided by Nilsson (2002), while Subramanian and Wei (2007) find a significant and positive 
impact of the EU GSP on total trade, albeit the effect is negative for the agro-food sector. In a 
recent paper, Cardamone (2009) restricts the evaluation to four products included in the fruit and 
vegetable sector (oranges, mandarins, apples and fresh grapes) by using monthly data at HS8 
level. She shows that the impact of trade preferences differs according to the commodity under 
scrutiny. In particular, the GSP has a positive impact in increasing exports of apples and 
mandarins to the EU, while ACPs preferences are successful in enhancing EU imports of fresh 
grapes and mandarins. Furthermore, RTAs seem to achieve the goal of improving EU imports of 
all fruits but oranges. Agostino et al. (2008) find a positive impact of the EU GSP on the total 
exports of DCs, although the significance of the estimated parameter is very low. Moreover, 
when using 2-digit agricultural data, they reveal that the ordinary GSP only has a positive effect 
in the meat sector and that its impact is negative and significant in the livestock and sugar sectors  
and not significant in other agricultural sectors. Finally, they find that, for LDCs, only the GSP 
has a positive impact in the fruit and vegetable sector. Persson and Wilhelmsson (2007) find that 
ACPs preferences had the largest effects over the period 1960-2002, while eligible countries for 
GSP did not gain any advantage from the scheme. The same result can be found for the year      8 
 
2004 in Cipollina and Salavatici (2007). As far as the EU GSP-Drug is concerned, Persson and 
Wilhelmsson (2007) find a negative impact for this scheme on the exports of beneficiaries. 
Finally, considering LDCs and the period 1991-1999, Persson (2005) finds that trade preferences 
enjoyed by LDCs had a negative influence on their exports. Further evidence of the negative 
impact of the EBA preferences is provided by Pishbahar and Huchet-Bourdon (2009), who also 
show that EU agricultural imports from EBA countries decreased over the period 2000-2004.  
These mixed results regarding the actual effectiveness of the EU GSP may be better 
understood if we briefly refer to the conclusions obtained by other authors who have studied the 
structure and utilisation of GSP preferences. 
When dealing with the structure of the GSP trade preferences, some authors (Brenton, 
2003; Hoekman et al., 2001; Stevens and Kennan, 2000; Tangermann, 2002) observe that the 
preferential treatment of GSP is only generous with regards to a few products. Indeed, not every 
product benefits from trade preferences, and many goods receive a preference only within tight 
quotas. For instance, the MFN tariffs applied to EU imports of many tropical products are zero 
(cfr table 1) or negligible and so the preferences under the ordinary-GSP are of little or no use. 
Moreover, other products (eg., temperate raw products or processed food products) have been 
excluded from any preferential regime for a long period (Bureau et al., 2007; EU Commission, 
2004). Finally, the same protectionist motives that prompt the EU to erect high trade barriers in 
many agricultural sectors (fruits, tropical fruits) also provide the grounds for not granting 
generous trade preferences in favour of DCs. This also holds true for the EBA initiative which, 
since its entering into force, has not allowed immediate free access to the EU market of three 
particularly important products for LDCs (rice, sugar and bananas) (cfr footnote 6).  
Another important issue is the utilisation of trade preferences, which is defined as the 
ratio between the value of the imports actually receiving preferential treatment and the value of 
total imports eligible for that preference. The conclusion drawn from the related literature is that 
the preferential treatment granted under the EU GSP is underutilised. The main explanation 
given for this under-utilisation refers to the constraints of RoO, cost of compliance and 
requirements related to certification. As has been documented by Candau and Jean (2005) and 
Inama (2004), the rate of utilisation of the EU GSP is estimated at around 50% between 1994 
and 2001. In 2000, requests for preferential access to the EU market were made for only 50% of 
the eligible imports from non-ACP LDCs (Candau and Jean, 2005; Inama, 2004). Two reasons 
for this are that the utilisation of preferential schemes is often costly and the beneficiary 
countries are not always able to meet the technical requirements. Thus, the greater the cost, the 
lower the benefit of any given preferential margin is. Moreover, the GSP often competes with 
other preferential arrangements. For instance, 36 ACP countries benefited both from the Cotonou      9 
 
agreement and the EBA initiative, but they prefer to export under the Cotonou agreement 
because of the high costs attached to EBA preferences (Brenton; 2003; Bureau et al., 2007; 
Manchin, 2005; Stevens and Kennan, 2004). On the other hand, Brenton and Ikezuki (2005) 
underline a high degree of preference utilisation and show that, in 2002 only 2.4% of African 
exports to the EU failed to make use of trade preferences. This result is similar to that found in 
OECD (2005), where it is argued that, taken individually, the utilisation rate for some schemes 
may seem low, but that this is mostly due to the fact that certain products are eligible for 
preferential treatment under more than one scheme. The developing countries’ agricultural and 
food exports that do not benefit from trade preferences represent a fraction of those eligible for 
preferences. Bureau and Gallezot (2004) compute that eligible imports and utilised preferences 
represented 38% and 32% respectively of total EU agricultural and food imports in 2002. With 
regards imports with non-zero MFN tariffs, 56% were eligible for a trade preference and 47% 
actually received one. Hence, the utilisation rate was 83% for those imports eligible for 
preferential treatment.   
From these studies, it emerges that EU GSP preferences are under-utilised and this is for 
different reasons. First of all, if one considers exports of a product to the EU, the Cotonou 
agreement generally offers the same, or greater, advantages to an ACP country as the GSP does, 
and, if a country only benefits from the GSP, it will tend to be relatively discriminated against 
rather than preferred (Brenton, 2003). In addition, the RoO could explain the low utilisation of 
the EU GSP. The costs and complexity of implementing the terms required by a preference are 
principally due to the cost of compliance with administrative or technical requirements (Candau 
and Jean 2005; Manchin, 2005; Waino et al. 2005). 
To sum up, studies of the GSP scheme focus on the agricultural sector, as it both plays a 
crucial role in DC economies and is highly protected in the European market. The literature 
agrees that the GSP scheme appeared rather generous, when compared to similar schemes run by 
other developed countries (Japan, USA), albeit only for a limited number of products and 
countries. At the same time, the literature reveals that there are doubts about the actual 
effectiveness of GSP preferences in enhancing DC exports to EU markets. 
 
IV. A descriptive analysis of EU agricultural imports from GSP countries 
In this section, we present an analysis of EU agricultural imports from GSP countries. We refer 
to EU agro-food imports for all GSP, GSP-Drug and EBA countries over the period 2001-2007 
(data are from the COMTRADE database) and consider both EU agricultural imports as a whole 
and imports disaggregated by product group.      10 
 
From figure 1, it emerges that EU agricultural imports increased over the period under 
scrutiny: in 2008, they were worth about US$148 billion, in other words twice the value (US$65 
billion) observed in 2001 (data are expressed at 2001 constant prices). While this trend is in line 
with that observed for world imports, the  comparison between the two time series suggests that 
a stable trend is exhibited by EU imports as a share of world imports (this share is about 14%-
15% for each year of the period under scrutiny). Another interesting detail from figure 1 is that 
of the role of DCs in EU agricultural markets. On the one hand, data indicate that DCs are the 
largest suppliers to the EU, with a share of  about 2/3 of total EU agricultural imports. On the 
other hand, it emerges that DC share of these imports is stable over time, with a weak shift from 
66.8% in 2001 to 65.8% in 2008.  
Figure 1  EU agricultural imports and world agricultural imports (2001-2008)
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In figure 2 we have presented trends for EU agricultural imports from six groups of countries. 
The first five groups are those countries which are eligible for the trade preferences established 
under the GSP, ACP, GSP-Drug, EBA and the EuroMed agreements,
8 while the latter group 
(Rest of the World, RoW) is comprised of all other exporters. We wanted to ascertain whether 
EU imports of agro-food products from DCs and LDCs had increased and if their growth was 
uniform or not. Most EU agricultural imports come from GSP countries and from the RoW. The 
exports of GSP countries to the EU doubled over the period considered (from US$ 27.2 billion in 
2001 to more than US$ 61 billion in 2008). The same applies for the RoW (from US$ 21.5 
                                                 
8 The EBA, the GSP-Drug and the EuroMed agreements include 49, 15 and 12 countries respectively, 
while the ACP group we consider is formed by all ACPs non-LDCs and the GSP group comprises all 
DCs, other than those of ACP, EBA, GSP-Drug and EuroMed samples (cfr. Appendix A).       11 
 
billion in 2001 to US$ 51 billion in 2008 at 2001 constant prices) as well as for Mediterranean 
countries and for DCs eligible for GSP-Drug. The value of LDC agricultural exports to the EU 
shows a increasing trend, but at a lesser rate than that observed for the other groups of countries. 
All these trends imply that the composition of EU agricultural imports has not changed over time 
and that GSP countries have maintained a dominant position, followed by the RoW. In this 
context, the EBA and the ACP countries register a decrease in their market shares in the EU 
agricultural market; in the case of EBA countries, shifting from 3.05% in 2001 to 2.5% in 2007, 



















Source: UN COMTRADE 
 
A further aspect to be considered is the composition of exports by product. Table 2 
highlights the structure of agricultural exports from the DC eligible for GSP treatment to the EU 
market from 2001 to 2008, while tables 3 and 4 refer to countries eligible for GSP-Drug and 
EBA respectively. From table 2 it emerges that just four groups of products (fisheries; edible 
fruits and nuts; residues and waste from the food industry; oil seeds and oleaginous fruits) 
accounted for about 50% of EU agricultural imports from GSP countries in 2001 and more than 
43% in 2008. If, on one hand, these data indicate that GSP agricultural exports have, over time, 
tended to become less concentrated, on the other hand, it emerges that the shares of each sector 
appear quite stable, except for animal or vegetables fats and oils whose quota increases from 
4.78% in 2001 to 10.36% in 2008. The concentration is higher when considering GSP-Drug 
(Table 3). In such a case, the exports of  two products alone (edible vegetables, roots and tubers; 
coffee, tea, mate and spices) make up more than 60% of total EU agricultural imports from GSP-
Drug countries and the increases in market shares which can be quoted as being significant 
regard animal or vegetables fats and oils (from less than 1% in 2001-2003 to more than 4% in      12 
 
2008), preparations of meat (from 3.68% in 2001 to more than 6% at the end of the period) and 
beverages, spirit and vinegar (from 1% in 2001 to about 2% in 2008). Finally, moving to EU 
agro-food imports from EBA countries, we find different and conflicting results (Table 4). 
Indeed, fisheries is the most important sector for EBA countries, although the market share 
shows a regular, marked, declining trend (from 43.27% in 2001 to 36.13% in 2007 and 29.82% 
in 2008). The exports of coffee, tea, mate and spices account for about 15% of total EBA 
agricultural exports to the EU and those of tobacco for about 10%. In contrast with the analysis 
of export composition under the ordinary GSP and GSP-Drug, the picture coming from the EBA 
initiative indicates a certain increase in the diversification of EBA agricultural exports. Indeed, 
the export structure of EBA changed in favour of several products (e.g. sugar, cocoa, live trees, 
edible fruits) whose weight increased over the period 2001-2008, while, at the same time, the 
share of a few products (preparations of meat, animal or vegetable fats and oils; oil seeds and 
oleaginous fruits) decreased slightly.  
To sum up, vegetable products (fruits, vegetables, cereals, coffee etc.) and fisheries were 
the largest group of EU imports from DCs eligible for GSP preferential treatment, followed by 
prepared foodstuffs (preparations of meat, cereal based foods, sugar confections, beer, wine, 
spirits, and tobacco). The relative importance of these sectors in the export basket of DCs may 
be,  ceteris paribus, a mirror of the protection in the EU market for agricultural and food 
products. An issue which will be addressed in the following section.  
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H S 2 2 0 0 12 0 0 22 0 0 32 0 0 42 0 0 52 0 0 62 0 0 72 0 0 8
Live Animals 0.63 0.64 0.66 0.65 0.62 0.42 0.40 0.39
Meat and edible meat offal 4.59 4.19 4.15 4.04 4.39 4.46 4.95 3.80
Fisheries 15.23 13.83 14.29 13.10 13.47 14.60 12.56 8.62
Dairy products 0.51 0.64 0.76 0.72 0.52 0.48 0.42 0.54
Products of animal origin 1.46 1.42 1.31 1.42 1.41 1.31 1.11 1.32
Live trees and other plants 1.62 1.71 1.70 1.67 1.63 1.63 1.46 1.52
Edible vegetables, roots & tubers 4.53 4.57 4.32 4.87 4.72 4.83 5.62 4.49
Edible fruits & nuts 13.29 13.00 13.72 13.70 14.80 14.15 13.12 12.98
Coffee, tea, mate & spices 5.87 5.14 4.83 4.67 5.40 5.63 5.23 5.82
Cereals 2.16 3.21 2.90 2.59 1.97 2.55 5.35 4.44
Products of the milling industry 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.09 0.12 0.10
Oil seeds & oleaginous fruits 9.08 8.43 8.82 8.83 7.93 7.07 7.59 8.30
Lacs, gums, resins & other veg. saps 0.57 0.53 0.47 0.51 0.55 0.57 0.51 0.50
Vegetable products n.e.s. 0.26 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.16 0.17 0.15
Animal or vegetable fats & oils 4.78 5.76 6.16 7.02 7.32 8.28 7.90 10.36
Preparations of meat 4.59 4.46 4.51 4.48 4.95 5.14 4.92 5.68
Sugars  2.79 2.81 2.67 2.65 2.64 2.44 2.15 2.20
Cocoa & cocoa preparations 2.06 2.77 3.33 2.84 3.08 2.80 2.94 3.15
Preps. of cereals, flour, starch, etc. 0.48 0.54 0.56 0.59 0.62 0.66 0.64 0.76
Preps. of vegetables, fruits, nuts & plants 6.39 6.80 6.43 6.56 6.73 6.62 6.27 6.16
Miscellaneous edible preparations 0.79 0.85 0.84 0.86 0.97 1.12 1.18 1.24
Beverages, spirits & vinegar 3.86 4.10 3.97 4.14 4.16 4.00 3.95 4.05
Residues and waste from food industry 11.25 11.09 10.54 11.33 9.55 8.84 9.41 11.25
Tobacco & tobacco products 3.14 3.22 2.80 2.50 2.27 2.15 2.05 2.17




HS2 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Live Animals 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
Meat and edible meat offal 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00
Fisheries 8.75 7.54 7.67 7.77 8.68 9.27 8.40 5.44
Dairy products 0.07 0.08 0.16 0.13 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.06
Products of animal origin 0.13 0.15 0.11 0.14 0.13 0.08 0.07 0.08
Live trees and other plants 6.65 6.49 5.64 5.15 4.73 4.59 4.35 3.97
Edible vegetables, roots & tubers 2.00 2.16 2.03 2.34 2.46 2.53 2.52 2.31
Edible fruits & nuts 42.38 46.34 47.98 49.64 46.14 44.10 44.72 48.18
Coffee, tea, mate & spices 21.96 17.73 15.73 15.01 17.09 18.27 16.70 18.80
Cereals 0.10 0.45 0.10 0.12 0.13 0.23 0.26 0.13
Products of the milling industry 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.08
Oil seeds & oleaginous fruits 0.62 0.54 0.47 0.53 0.82 0.58 0.51 0.83
Lacs, gums, resins & other veg. saps 0.09 0.14 0.06 0.15 0.08 0.13 0.13 0.09
Vegetable products n.e.s. 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.09
Animal or vegetable fats & oils 0.77 0.68 0.87 1.74 2.30 1.84 3.14 4.12
Preparations of meat 3.68 4.84 5.82 5.49 6.00 6.05 6.20 5.15
Sugars  0.18 0.17 0.17 0.23 0.20 0.32 0.32 0.25
Cocoa & cocoa preparations 0.92 1.49 1.89 1.62 1.52 1.34 1.58 1.80
Preps. of cereals, flour, starch, etc. 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.10 0.07 0.08 0.05
Preps. of vegetables, fruits, nuts & plants 4.37 4.31 4.01 3.83 3.37 3.72 4.39 3.54
Miscellaneous edible preparations 1.17 1.07 0.88 0.79 0.85 0.79 0.81 0.85
Beverages, spirits & vinegar 0.94 1.20 1.60 1.88 2.03 2.13 1.83 1.83
Residues and waste from food industry 3.79 3.35 3.60 2.34 2.52 3.20 3.16 1.83
Tobacco & tobacco products 1.19 1.00 0.96 0.89 0.61 0.56 0.64 0.49
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HS2 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Live Animals 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.04 0.05 0.05
Meat and edible meat offal 0.19 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.02
Fisheries 43.27 43.75 41.83 39.99 37.70 39.90 36.13 29.82
Dairy products 0.04 0.05 0.14 0.12 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05
Products of animal origin 0.15 0.15 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.06
Live trees and other plants 2.10 2.04 1.81 1.85 2.13 2.71 3.66 5.18
Edible vegetables, roots & tubers 3.24 3.66 3.45 3.93 3.92 3.94 3.64 3.84
Edible fruits & nuts 2.66 2.63 3.14 5.04 3.00 3.01 4.14 3.82
Coffee, tea, mate & spices 17.31 16.22 16.35 14.90 17.68 16.35 14.99 17.75
Cereals 0.11 0.21 0.22 0.37 0.19 0.27 1.01 0.59
Products of the milling industry 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.13 0.10 0.08 0.10 0.06
Oil seeds & oleaginous fruits 3.78 3.27 3.24 3.36 2.66 2.50 2.22 3.99
Lacs, gums, resins & other veg. saps 2.10 1.98 1.97 3.11 4.90 2.40 2.38 2.75
Vegetable products n.e.s. 0.38 0.36 0.39 0.38 0.28 0.26 0.25 0.25
Animal or vegetable fats & oils 4.22 3.82 2.63 2.20 1.95 1.76 2.89 2.38
Preparations of meat 3.74 3.84 4.56 5.07 4.15 3.34 2.50 2.44
Sugars  3.04 4.25 5.56 5.30 5.98 6.28 7.02 8.50
Cocoa & cocoa preparations 1.07 1.91 2.30 2.36 4.15 5.26 5.44 7.59
Preps. of cereals, flour, starch, etc. 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.14 0.14 0.18
Preps. of vegetables, fruits, nuts & plants 0.33 0.49 0.51 0.59 0.59 0.61 0.50 0.53
Miscellaneous edible preparations 0.51 0.47 0.44 0.37 0.53 0.57 0.50 0.76
Beverages, spirits & vinegar 0.12 0.45 0.45 0.08 0.10 0.18 0.15 0.18
Residues and waste from food industry 1.55 1.45 0.84 0.64 0.20 0.52 0.48 0.17
Tobacco & tobacco products 9.81 8.70 9.73 9.89 9.40 9.68 11.65 9.04





V. Some descriptive statistics on GSP tariffs  
This paragraph focuses on the preferential trade tariffs applied by the EU to its imports from 
GSP countries. The indicators used to measure the level of preferences offered by the EU GSP 
scheme in 2004 and 2006 are summarised in table 5. In 2004, 1,658 tariff lines were eligible for 
a tariff reduction under the ordinary GSP, i.e. 48% of the total of 3,453 product lines covered by 
the scheme. This proportion increased to 69% (2,489 preferred goods out of 3,603 total lines) 
when considering the GSP-Drug and to approximately 98% (3,631 out of  3,683 lines) for the 
EBA initiative. In 2006, the coverage of products benefiting from trade preferences was 57% for 
the GSP, 63% for the GSP-Drug and 98% for the EBA schemes. In terms of the absolute 
incidence of GSP coverage, it is interesting to note that the number of products enjoying a 
preference under the ordinary GSP increased from 1,658 in 2004 to 1,998 in 2006, while there 
was a decrease under the GSP-Drug from 2,489 products in 2004 to 2,178 in 2006. In 2006, there 
were 3,390 products eligible for EBA preferences, which was fewer than the 3,631 preferred 
lines in 2004. The sum effect, combining the coverage of the schemes and the number of 
products with zero-duty in each agreement (columns 5 and 6 of table 5), represents the average 
tariff faced by exporting countries and the resulting margin of preference. As expected, the 
simple average tariff was high for products exported under MFN conditions (more than 19% in      15 
 
2004 and 2006) and decreased to around 17% in the case of the ordinary GSP. The applied tariff 
for GSP-Drug was 14% and it was very low for the EBA initiative (1.36% in 2004 and 0.38% in 
2006). Finally, we can see that the preferential margin was significantly high only for EBA 
schemes (around 18%), while it was 5% for the GSP-Drug and just around 2% for the ordinary 
GSP (Table 5). In conclusion, it can be said that even if the average rate for GSP tariffs did not 
change much between the old and the new GSP schemes, the number of tariff lines involved 
increased. This is particularly true when considering the ordinary GSP.   
  Based on these results, on one hand, one would expect the GSP scheme to have a 
generally modest impact, as the trade preferences it gives to DCs are, on average, very low. 
However, by analysing EU imports from preferred countries (cfr figures 2 and 3), it emerges, on 
the other hand, that there was an increase in trade even though the preferential margin in 
percentage points changed slightly over time. All this suggests that export flows depend not only 
on other variables (see § VII and VIII), but also on the structure of trade preferences granted by 
the EU.  In order to look at this issue in detail, table 6 shows the number of products by the level 
of GSP applied duties. In 2004, 973 products faced a duty greater than 20%, while the tariff 
applied to a further 958 goods ranged between 10% and 20%. These products faced a tariff of 
more than 10% and represented more than 50% of the products covered by the GSP. In contrast, 
the tariff applied to 602 products ranged from 1% to 5% and was less than 1% for the other 547 
goods.  
  Table 7 compares the level of GSP tariffs and the margin of preferences for each group 
of HS2-digit agricultural products for the years 2004 and 2006.
9   The data allows us to observe 
whether, and to what extent, tariffs differed across sectors, trade arrangements and from one year 
to another. By limiting the discussion to the margin of preferences, it can be noticed that, as 
expected, there are relevant differences between the ordinary GSP and the GSP-Drug. 
Furthermore, the preferential margin is quite stable in 2004 and 2006 (the major changes 
™occurred in fisheries [from 3.99% to 2.01% ], vegetables [3.1%; 2.25%], preparations of meat 
[5.22%;4.19%]).
  The agricultural sectors with the highest margins of preference under the 
ordinary GSP regime were tobacco (about 8.16% in 2006), preparations of meat (5.22% in 
                                                 
9 This data is based on the DBTAR database built up by J. Gallezot from INRA (See Gallezot 2006). 
From this source, we have extracted and computed EU ad valorem equivalents (AVE) of the MFN and 
GSP tariffs for agri-food products for 2006 in order to assess the size of the preference margin offered 
by the GSP scheme. The 2006 AVE has been computed with the 2004 unit value in order to be 
comparable with the 2004 AVE; in other words, any differences in the preference margin between the 
two years are due to changes in the GSP tariff, not to differences in world prices. The HS2 average 
tariffs faced by the beneficiaries of the GSP have been computed using a simple average of the AVEs 
calculated at the NC10 level. When a line was excluded from preferences, the MFN AVE has been used 
for the computation. When the tariff evolved during the year (due to seasonal changes, for example), a 
simple average over the year has been used.       16 
 
2006), preparations of fruits and vegetables (4.98% in 2006) and fisheries (3.99% in 2006). The 
average margin was modest in the chapters of livestock, meat, dairy products, other animal 
products, cereals, products of the milling industry, oilseeds, sugar, and residues and waste from 
the food industry. To sum up, the level of the preferential tariff granted by the GSP did not 
change much as a result of the introduction of the 2006 GSP scheme (on average, less than one 





















Total 3683 100 0 < marg < 175.22 0 < marg < 184.76 0 < marg < 184.76
>20% 973 26 0 < marg < 175.22 0.14 < marg < 184.76 8.86 < marg < 184.76
10‐20% 958 26 1 < marg < 16.97 1.3 < marg < 19.97 1.68 < marg < 19.97
5‐10% 603 16 0.5 < marg < 9.71 0.16 < marg < 9.94 3.84 < marg < 9.94
1‐5% 602 16 0.09 < marg < 4.36 0.6< marg < 4.96 1.15 < marg < 4.16
<1% 547 15 0 < marg < 0.97 0 < marg < 0.97 0 < marg < 0.97
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Chapters  (HS2)  2006 2004 2006 2004 2006 2004  2006 2004  2006  2004 
01-  Live  animals  40.17 40.17 40.04 40.04 40.49 40.49 0.33  0.33  0.45  0.45 
02-  Meat  43.85 43.45 43.47 43.31 43.97 43.71 0.12  0.25  0.50  0.40 
03-  Fisheries  6.51 8.73 0.03 0.03  10.51  10.74  4.00 2.02  10.47  10.71 
04-  Dairies  52.40 50.23 51.92 50.12 52.70 50.68 0.30  0.45  0.79  0.56 
05-  Other  animal  products  0.08 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.24 0.24  0.17 0.17  0.24  0.24 
06-  Live  trees  and  plants  3.33 3.56 0.00 0.00 6.40 6.79  3.08 3.23  6.40  6.79 
07-  Vegetables  38.79 37.67 37.76 36.15 41.89 39.92 3.10  2.25  4.13  3.77 
08-  Fruits  18.54 19.08 17.38 17.71 20.26 20.64 1.72  1.56  2.88  2.94 
09-  Coffee,  tea,  spices  1.09 1.09 0.00 0.12 3.05 3.05  1.96 1.96  3.05  2.93 
10-  Cereals  18.85 36.60 18.84 36.58 18.86 36.60 0.01  0.00  0.02  0.02 
11-  Products  of  the  milling  ind.  22.29 22.22 21.89 21.78 22.55 22.51 0.26  0.29  0.66  0.73 
12-  Oilseeds  1.66 1.31 0.87 0.86 2.38 2.35  0.72 1.04  1.51  1.49 
13-  Lac,  gums,  resins  5.11 5.24 0.00 0.00 7.93 7.89  2.82 2.65  7.93  7.89 
14-  Other  vegetable  products  0 0 0 0 0 0  0 0  0  0 
15-  Oils  and  fats  5.61 5.73 2.78 2.86 8.54 8.60  2.94 2.87  5.76  5.75 
16- Preparations of meat, fish  12.80  13.75  4.21  4.34  18.03  17.94  5.23  4.19  13.82  13.60 
17-  Sugar  19.94 21.18 18.78 20.19 20.57 21.74 0.63  0.56  1.80  1.55 
18-  Cocoa  22.99 22.92 21.27 21.37 24.16 23.96 1.17  1.05  2.89  2.59 
19-  Preparations  of  cereals  26.34 27.67 23.45 24.35 29.45 30.86 3.11  3.19  6.00  6.51 
20- Preparations of fruits and veg.  18.19  18.18  4.25  3.98  23.16  22.55  4.98  4.37  18.92  18.57 
21- Miscellaneous edible preparations  11.03  11.46  5.97  6.28  14.33  14.85  3.29  3.39  8.36  8.57 
22-  Beverages  11.98 11.16  7.74  7.42  13.34 12.64 1.36  1.49  5.60  5.23 
23-  Waste  from  food  industry  15.01 12.76 14.71 12.51 15.92 13.60 0.91  0.84  1.21  1.09 
24- Tobacco  10.15  10.15 0  0 18.31  18.31 8.16  8.16  18.31 18.31 
Source: own computation based on data from DBTAR (2006) and Taric.                19 
 
 
VI. The gravity equation  
The gravity model is widely used to explain the pattern of bilateral trade between nations and its 
formulation is based on the idea that trade is positively influenced by the economic mass of the 
trading countries and negatively affected by the geographical distance between them. Again, 
trade flows are subject to trade resistance factors which can be improved by preferential trade 
arrangements, such as the EU GSP. 
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where subscript i refers to the importing countries, which, in our case, are the members of EU-
15; j refers to the exporting country; l to the product line; t is time. The notation is defined as 
follows: 
t
ijl M are the exports of products l from country j to country i at time t; 
t
i GDP   and 
t
j GDP represent the economic size of country i and country j at time t;
t
i POP  and 
t
j POP  are the 
populations of the two countries at time t;  ij DIST  is the distance between the locations measured 
from capital to capital; Language is a dummy that takes value 1 if countries i and j speak the 
same language, and 0 otherwise; Colony is a dummy that takes value 1 if colonial links exist (or 
have existed) between countries i and j, and 0 otherwise; Border is a binary variable assuming 
the value 1 if countries i and j share a common land border, and 0 otherwise;  ijl u is a composite 
error term. 
As mentioned above (cfr § 1), for the purpose of this study, we have to address the 
crucial issue of the measure of the trade preferences, which, in the related literature, have been 
often captured through dummy variables, which are equal to one if the exporting country belongs 
to a PTA and zero otherwise. Thus, their coefficient is expected to be positive because preferred 
countries should export more than non-preferred countries. However, this approach is not wholly 
satisfactory because dummies treat all preferences as a homogeneous group, without taking into 
account their specific characteristics. Furthermore dummies do not distinguish between different 
preferential instruments, such us preferential margins, quotas and entry prices. Finally, they do 
not consider the rate of preference utilisation and the cost of compliance.       20 
 
There have recently been some studies that have used preferential margin or tariffs to 
assess potential benefits deriving from preferential schemes (Cardamone, 2009; Cipollina and 
Salvatici, 2007; Emlinger et al., 2009). Some of these studies (Cardamone, 2009; Cipollina and 
Salvatici, 2007) have calculated the preferential margin as the difference between the highest 
tariff applied by the EU and the duty paid by an exporter for a given product. While Cipollina 
and Salvatici (2007) do not distinguish between different preferential margins, Cardamone 
(2009) does. Emlinger et al., 2009 used the tariffs rather than the preferential margin to measure 
the preferences granted. Following these recent papers and in order to overcome many of the 
shortcomings related to the dummy approach, this paper employs a quantitative measure of the 
trade preferences and, in this sense, the other elements in eq. [1] (GSP, GSP-Drug, EBA, ACP, 
MED) become the key variables of our analysis. They represent the preferential margin 
established under a given agreement in favor of a country when exporting certain commodities to 
the country giving preferences. For instance, 
t
ijl GSP is the preferential margin under the ordinary 
GSP that the j-th country enjoys at time t when exporting product line l to country i. The same 
applies for the other preference variables (GSP-Drug, EBA, ACP and MED). For each trade 
agreement, the preferential margin is defined as the ratio between the preferential margin (the 
difference between the MFN and the preferential duties at each tariff line) and the MFN tariff.  













                                         (2)
 
where i refers to importers, who, in our case, are the members of EU-15, j indicates the exporting 
countries, l is the tariff line and t is time. PREF_TARIFF indicates the preferential tariffs applied 
under the specific trade arrangement (GSP, GSP-Drug, EBA, ACP, MED).  This measure allows 
us to take into account the size of the actual tariff preference for a particular product.
10 The 
overlapping of preferences has been solved by taking for a given trade flow the maximum 
margin of preference as that which has been used by the beneficiary country. For instance, if a 
country is eligible for preferential treatment under both the GSP and the Cotonou agreement, and 
                                                 
10 The MFN and the preferential tariffs come from the DBTAR database (see Appendix B), which has 
enabled us to identify the tariffs applied by the EU under the different preferential regimes. We have 
extracted tariff data at the 10-digit level and consolidated it at the 6-digit level for each partner and each 
year, by averaging (simple average) the data of 10-digit lines. For each preferential scheme, each 
product line and each year, we have generated the simple average of preferential tariffs and computed 
the preferential margin. To assign the preferential margin to country groups, we use dummies for the 
country groups belonging to different preferential schemes. For each country and each preferential 
scheme, we have constructed a dummy that takes a value of 1 if the country benefits from a particular 
scheme and zero otherwise.      21 
 
the preferential margins are, respectively, 3% and 5%, we assume that country will export under 
the Cotonou agreement and set the GSP preferences equal zero. 
The econometric analysis considers the imports of each EU-15 member of HS6-digit 763 
agricultural products (cfr footnote 3) from 169 exporters (the exporting countries are listed in 
Appendix A). In estimating the eq. [1] we consider the 4-year period 2001-2004, and this time 
coverage is due to the availability of data on tariffs for the very large set of products. The only 
dataset which makes a large amount of statistics easily available on tariffs, such as the ones we 
need to run our regressions at HS6-digit level, is DBTAR (2006) and this source covers the 
period 2001-2004. 
 
VII. Econometric issues and the estimation method 
In estimating a gravity model, there are three econometric issues to be addressed which are 
related to the non-observable heterogeneity of countries and to sample selection bias. 
With regards country heterogeneity, it ought to be said that it introduces bias into the 
estimation because of the likely correlation between non–observable, country-specific effects 
and the explanatory variables of the gravity equation. Heterogeneity may be due to observable 
and unobservable factors (such as the propensity of one country to export more than others, 
cultural and historical links or business cycle effects), and/or to several other aspects which 
define each country-pair background (i.e., common language, colonial past, shared border or 
religion). While this background based on observable factors can be handled by using a set of 
dummy variables, it is necessary to use a model with country fixed effects to control for non-
observable factors (Serlenga and Shin 2007). In order to take into account countries’ 
heterogeneity, we have decomposed the error term of equation (1) as follows: 
 
(3) 
where  αi    and  αj  refer to time-invariant importer and exporter-country fixed effects, 
respectively,  l α  to  commodity fixed effects,  t α  to time fixed effects and finally  ijl
t ε  is an 
idiosyncratic error term. The fixed effects were meant to capture all unobserved factors that 
influence export flows, while the time variable allowed us to control for macro-economic factors 
that may have occurred over our sample period.  
As far as sample selection bias is concerned, it must be pointed out that there is a long 
tradition of using a log-linearization of gravity equations. However this procedure fails when 
zero trade observations are present and will lead to biased estimates. There is a great deal of 
evidence that zeros are frequent in bilateral trade. For instance, Haveman and Hummels (2004) 
ijl
t
t l j i ijl
t u ε α α α α + + + + =     22 
 
find that almost 1/3 of bilateral trade flowing between 173 countries in 1990 was zero, while 
Helpman et al. (2008) show that about half the country pairs in their sample of 158 trading 
countries did not trade with each other from 1970 to 1997. In our case, because of the product 
disaggregation, zeros extend to 90% of the entire sample. Therefore, dropping zeros implies a 
loss of useful information as to why some countries trade in certain sectors and not in others. 
The issue of zero-trade flows has been widely addressed in the literature on gravity 
empirics (Martinez-Zarzoso et al., 2007; Martin and Pham, 2008; Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 
2006). In particular, Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) contribute to the discussion as to which 
estimator provides the most reliable results by assessing the potential bias of elasticities in a log 
linearised regression. They show that the consistency of an OLS estimator depends on a 
restrictive assumption regarding the error terms and suggest that the gravity equation could be 
estimated in its multiplicative form by using the Pseudo Quasi Maximum Likelihood Method 
(PQML) based on a Poisson Model. Moreover since the standard Poisson model is vulnerable to 
problems such as over-dispersion and excess zero flows, we have used other estimation 
techniques, i.e. the Zero Inflated Poisson (ZIP) and the Negative Binomial Regression (NBR), as 
in Burger, van Oort, and Linders (2009). 
More precisely, Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) argue that linearisation of the gravity 
equation in the presence of heteroskedasticity leads to inconsistent estimates because the 
expected value of the logarithm of a random variable depends both on its mean and on higher-
order moments of its distribution. Hence, if variance of the error term depends on regressors, the 
expected value of the error term logarithm will also depend on the regressors, violating the 
condition of consistency of OLS. The PML allows us to estimate the gravity equation and, more 
generally, constant elasticity models in their multiplicative form, and to allow for 
heteroskedasticity. However, an important condition of the Poisson model is equi-dispersion. In 
many cases, though, the conditional variance is normally higher than the conditional mean, 
which implies that the dependent variable is over-dispersed. The Poisson regression model only 
accounts for observed heterogeneity, where different values of the predictor variables result in a 
different conditional mean value. Unobserved heterogeneity, however, originates from omitted 
variables; if we do not take into account unobserved heterogeneity, the results are inconsistent 
and inefficient. In order to correct for over-dispersion, a negative binomial regression model can 
be used. The expected value of the observed trade flow in the negative binomial regression 
model is the same as in the Poisson regression model, but the variance here is specified as a 
function of both the conditional mean and a dispersion parameter. In other words, an additional 
error term has been added to the negative binomial regression model. The standard errors in the 
Poisson Model will be biased downward resulting in spuriously large z-values and spuriously      23 
 
small p-values (Cameron and Trivedi, 1986, 31). The Zero-Inflated model accounts for two 
latent groups within the population: a group with zero counts and a group with a non-zero 
probability of having counts other than zero. As Burger et al. (2009, p. 175) summarise: these 
models “take into account that not all pairs of countries have the potential (or are at risk) to trade 
because of trade embargos or a severe mismatch between demand and supply. On a similar note, 
the geographical or cultural distance between countries may simply be too large for trade to be 
profitable. Hence, the profitability of trade, which reflects the trade potential, can be separated 
from the volume of trade as stemming from two different processes”. 
To sum up, we have evaluated the preferences for agro-food products (from HS01 to 
HS24) granted by the EU under its GSP scheme from 2001 to 2004 using five different 
estimators (OLS, LSDV,  PQML; ZIP and NBR), the results of which are presented in the 
successive section.  
 
VIII. Results 
In this section, we have summarised the results obtained when estimating equation [1] with the: 
the OLS, LSDV, PQML, NBR (Negative Binomial Regression) and the ZIP (Zero Inflated 
Poisson) procedures. The first estimations we made regarded the pooled data of all agricultural 
exports to the EU. Afterwards we ran separate regressions for the following groups of products: 
livestock, fisheries, fruits, lacs and gums, oils and fats, products of animal origin, sugar, 
vegetables, beverages and spirits, tobacco, tropical fruits and residues from the food industry. 
Whatever the estimation, the trade statistics used are identified at HS6- digit level. The results 
for the pooled data are presented in table 8, while those obtained sector-by-sector are presented 
in table 9.  
The first five columns of table 8 show the results obtained when equation [1] is estimated 
using the aforementioned methods. By comparing the outcomes, it emerges that the estimated 
parameters differed both in sign and magnitude. Briefly, when focussing on gravity standard 
variables, we found that the elasticity of importing country GDP was always positive and 
statistically significant in OLS (column 1), Poisson (column 3) and NBR (column 4) estimates. 
On the other hand, exporting country GDP was only found to exert a significant (and negative) 
impact in OLS results. As for the observable country-pair variables, we found that the best 
performing estimators were the Poisson and the NBR. It was only then, indeed, that some 
variables (Distance, Colonial Ties and Common Language) showed the expected signs and were 
statistically significant. The impact was significant and often had the wrong sign in all the other      24 
 
regressions. This was the case with Border, for instance, where, when significant, a negative sign 
emerged.  
With regards to the goal of this work, we found that the GSP preferential scheme exerted 
a positive and significant impact on beneficiary countries in all the regressions and was 
significant in OLS, LSDV and ZIP regressions. When significant, its estimated value ranged 
from 0,024 (ZIP regression) to 0,061 (LSDV estimates), whereas the estimate was 0.042 with the 
OLS. The same applied for the EBA initiative, whose coefficient was 0.025 in OLS results, 
0.038 in the ZIP regression and 0.086 when considering the LSDV estimator. The estimated 
coefficient of the GSP-Drug was significantly positive only when using the LSDV, while it 
turned out to be negative in the OLS and the ZIP regression (although in this case the 
significance was at the 10% level). Little encouraging evidence was found for the impact of the 
EuroMed agreement, which, at best, was positive and significant only in the LSDV regression. 
Finally, the preferential margin granted under the Cotonou Agreement in favour of ACPs 
positively affected the agricultural exports of beneficiaries only when the gravity model was 
estimated using the OLS and the LSDV techniques (table 8). 
Overall, the evidence emerging is mixed. On the one hand, the only clear indication 
comes in the form of the positive impact exerted by the Ordinary GSP. On the other hand, the 
only results regarding the impact of all of these preferential agreements are those obtained from 
the LSDV method. As can be seen in table 8, this estimator yields statistical and positive 
coefficients whatever the trade preference and, in this sense, one conclusion that can be drawn is 
that the largest impact was the one brought about by the EBA initiative (the estimated parameter 
is 0.086), followed by the ordinary GSP (0.061), Med (0.02), GSP-Drug (0.012) and, finally, by 
the Cotonou agreement (0.009).  
In order to check the robustness of results, we have re-estimated our models by replacing 
the five separate variables measuring the preferential  margins (Ordinary GSP, GSP-Drug, EBA, 
ACP and EuroMed) with the variable named MaxPref, which corresponds to the maximum 
margin of preference observed for each export flow. The rationale behind this variable is to 
address the overlapping of preferences by assuming that any trade flow is determined by only 
one trade agreement, i.e. by the one assuring the largest preference margin. This is similar to 
what we did before when addressing the issue of preference overlapping (cfr § VI), but in this 
case we use a single, common vector, MaxPref, instead of five different preferential variables. 
The use of this variable is meant to provide an overall assessment of the effectiveness of the 
trade preferences granted by the EU. The estimation outcomes, which are summarised in table 8, 
indicate that the sign of the coefficient of MaxPref is always positive, although is only 
significant in two out of three regressions (OLS and LSDV estimates). This robustness check      25 
 
tends to support the view that EU trade preferences help DCs export more to European 
agricultural markets. 
Finally, in the following we limit the presentation of the results obtained when running 
the gravity regression for each agricultural sector to those related to the Zero Inflated Poisson 
Regression. The estimates are displayed in table 9.  
In comparing results between agricultural groups, we found that the GDP coefficient for 
importing countries is positive and statistically significant in two cases, oils-fats and residues 
from the food industry, while it is negative and not significant in the other group of products. 
The GDP coefficient for exporting countries is negative and significant in all regressions except 
for tobacco, where it is positive and significant. The population coefficient of importing 
countries has an ambiguous sign, as well the population coefficient of exporting countries. 
Distance is unexpectedly positive and significant in the case of live trees, fruits, oils-fats and 
tropical fruits, at a level of significance of 1%. Border, colony and language have ambiguous 
signs. 
With respect to the preferential margin, the coefficient for the GSP presents a positive 
coefficient for the following agricultural groupings: live Trees (0.036), sugar (0.020), fruits 
(0.019), tropical fruits (0.038) and residues from the food industry (0.036), and a negative and 
significant coefficient for beverages-spirits (-0.084) and oils-fats (-0.204). The GSP-Drug shows 
positive and significant coefficient in oils-fats (0.054) and beverages-spirits (0.018), while it 
reports a negative and significant coefficient for residues from the food industry (-0.064) and 
live trees (-0.012). The EBA special initiative only has a positive and significant coefficient for 
lacs-gums (0.049), while, in the other groupings, its coefficient is positive but not statistically 
significant. The ACP coefficient is positive and significant for the following products: fruits 
(0.027), vegetables (0.012), lacs-gums (0.036) and beverages-spirits (0.031). The Mediterranean 
preferential margin is positive and significant for tropical fruits (0.028) and beverages-spirits 
(0.023), while it is negative and statistically significant for tobacco (-0.034). Nothing can be said 
with regards other products (fisheries and products of animal origin) since the Zero Inflated 
Poisson Regression does not converge.   
Based on these results, it may be argued that the evidence revealed regarding the sector 
by sector impact of trade preferences is puzzling. The impact of the GSP scheme is effective in 
increasing DC exports to EU of live trees, sugar, fruits, tropical fruits and residues from the food 
industry, while the GSP-Drug and the EBA are able to increase DC exports of oils and fats, 
beverages-spirits and lacs-gums. The Cotonou agreement is effective in increasing the exports of  
fruits, vegetables, lacs-gums and beverages-spirits, while the EuroMed agreement is effective in 






OLS LSDV  POISSON  NBR ZIP  OLS  LSDV  ZIP 
             
GDP IMPORTER  0.841*** 0.119  1.469*** 2.900*** 0.180 0.889***  0.142  1.491*** 
  [0.016] [0.257] [0.291] [0.636] [0.415]  [0.017]  [0.256]  [0.291] 
GDP EXPORTER  -0.102*** -0.013  0.010  0.004  -0.008 -0.027***  0.043  0.033* 
  [0.004] [0.038] [0.020] [0.051] [0.044]  [0.003]  [0.037]  [0.018] 
POP IMPORTER  -0.065*** -0.644  -2.921**  2.944  -0.163 -0.114***  -0.824  -2.874** 
  [0.016] [1.058] [1.372] [3.938] [1.564]  [0.017]  [1.055]  [1.362] 
POP EXPORTER  -0.091*** 0.530  -0.564  -1.561**  -0.247 -0.148***  1.087**  -0.262 
  [0.004] [0.436] [0.659] [0.739] [0.550]  [0.004]  [0.431]  [0.655] 
DISTANCE  0.079*** 0.230*** -0.400***  -0.636***  0.277***  0.083***  0.227*** -0.401*** 
  [0.006] [0.017] [0.068] [0.091] [0.027]  [0.005]  [0.017] [0.068] 
GSP  0.042*** 0.061*** 0.021  0.002  0.024***       
  [0.002] [0.003] [0.023] [0.023] [0.003]       
GSP DRUG  -0.016*** 0.012***  -0.015  -0.045  -0.007*       
  [0.002] [0.004] [0.019] [0.028] [0.004]       
EBA  0.025*** 0.086*** 0.042  0.010  0.038***       
  [0.002] [0.003] [0.035] [0.040] [0.004]       
ACP  0.010*** 0.009*** -0.021  -0.038*  -0.022***       
  [0.002] [0.002] [0.018] [0.023] [0.002]       
MED  -0.021*** 0.020***  -0.012  -0.028*  -0.008*       
  [0.002] [0.004] [0.013] [0.017] [0.005]       
BORDER  -0.274*** -0.014  -0.375*** 0.032  0.022  -0.206***  -0.016  -0.375*** 
  [0.023] [0.028] [0.070] [0.095] [0.040]  [0.022]  [0.028]  [0.070] 
LANGUAGE  -0.157*** -0.181*** 0.265***  0.276***  -0.154***  -0.086***  -0.184***  0.265*** 
  [0.017] [0.019] [0.058] [0.105] [0.025]  [0.016]  [0.019]  [0.058] 
COLONY  -0.002 -0.015 0.365***  0.699***  -0.025  -0.022  -0.019  0.365*** 
  [0.016] [0.018] [0.034] [0.066] [0.023]  [0.015]  [0.018]  [0.034] 
MAXPREF        0.037***  0.054***  0.010 
        [0.001]  [0.001]  [0.018] 
CONSTANT  -6.431*** 8.162  32.089  -76.210  11.869  -7.959***  -1.550  18.813 
  [0.200] [14.864]  [21.423]  [72.470]  [20.250]  [0.199]  [14.793]  [18.904] 
OBSERVATIONS  175884 175884 3712014  3712014  3712014  175884  175884  3712014 
R-squared  0.193 0.245       0.197  0.249   
Robust standard errors in brackets * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%      27 
 
   Table 9: Results from Zero Inflated Poisson regression, by groups of products (2001-2004). 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 











GDP IMPORTER  -0.364 0.411  -0.117  4.548***  0.529  -0.676**  -0.520 -0.716 1.482*  -0.202 
  [0.702]  [0.313] [0.442] [1.362]  [0.703] [0.318]  [0.566]  [0.569]  [0.781]  [1.024] 
GDP EXPORTER  -0.155*** -0.030  0.027  -0.011  -0.158***  -0.176***  -0.065**  -0.059**  0.037  0.085** 
  [0.026]  [0.019] [0.030] [0.035]  [0.032] [0.023]  [0.029]  [0.024]  [0.045]  [0.034] 
POP IMPORTER  7.804*** -1.220  1.035  -16.906***  -0.635  1.678  2.504  0.882  -6.167** 2.403 
  [2.809]  [1.245] [1.634] [5.269]  [3.093] [1.383]  [2.573]  [2.452]  [3.032]  [5.063] 
POP  EXPORTER  0.029  -0.091*** -0.089*** -0.050  0.034  0.008  -0.036  -0.008  -0.083  -0.109*** 
  [0.027]  [0.020] [0.026] [0.041]  [0.032] [0.021]  [0.025]  [0.023]  [0.051]  [0.039] 
DIST  0.113*** 0.065**  -0.027  0.114**  0.055  0.177***  0.029  0.024  0.119*** -0.016 
  [0.031]  [0.026] [0.040] [0.056]  [0.048] [0.030]  [0.031]  [0.033]  [0.044]  [0.056] 
GSP   0.036*** 0.019***  -0.204***  -0.015  0.020**  0.038***  0.005  -0.084***  0.036*** 0.018 
  [0.008]  [0.006] [0.030] [0.038]  [0.008] [0.007]  [0.009]  [0.008]  [0.013]  [0.015] 
GSP DRUG  -0.012* -0.010  0.054*** -0.017  -0.010  -0.015  -0.009  0.018* -0.064**  -0.006 
  [0.007]  [0.011] [0.014] [0.033]  [0.008] [0.010]  [0.009]  [0.010]  [0.030]  [0.014] 
EBA  -0.009 -0.001  0.049***  0.006 0.002  -0.012  -0.000  0.006 0.003 0.014 
  [0.008]  [0.008] [0.008] [0.015]  [0.011] [0.008]  [0.007]  [0.009]  [0.011]  [0.011] 
ACP  -0.004  0.027*** 0.036*** -0.012  0.007  -0.024***  0.012* 0.031***  0.008  -0.007 
  [0.008]  [0.006] [0.012] [0.013]  [0.007] [0.007]  [0.007]  [0.009]  [0.011]  [0.012] 
MED  0.010 -0.006  0.055**  0.039 -0.013  0.028**  -0.002  0.023**  0.021 -0.034* 
  [0.010]  [0.010] [0.024] [0.027]  [0.014] [0.012]  [0.012]  [0.011]  [0.020]  [0.017] 
BORDER  -0.066 -0.062  -0.278**  0.006 -0.093  -0.045  -0.245***  -0.197**  -0.075 -0.040 
  [0.095]  [0.062] [0.139] [0.166]  [0.137] [0.093]  [0.078]  [0.082]  [0.122]  [0.161] 
LANGUAGE  -0.111 -0.072  0.025  0.107 0.040  -0.126**  -0.126**  -0.063 -0.146 -0.153 
  [0.081]  [0.056] [0.060] [0.093]  [0.082] [0.061]  [0.051]  [0.066]  [0.117]  [0.129] 
COLONY  -0.038 -0.033  0.007  -0.117 0.019  -0.071  -0.064 -0.051 -0.161*  -0.069 
  [0.066]  [0.050] [0.067] [0.077]  [0.080] [0.060]  [0.055]  [0.068]  [0.089]  [0.108] 
Constant  -99.518*** 21.626  -2.421  162.095***  11.470  5.352  -12.384  18.192  71.581*  -21.044 
  [36.783]  [15.026] [19.606] [57.891]  [36.204] [19.964]  [30.303]  [28.019]  [40.000]  [60.362] 
Observations  83771 865525 143109 408350  111687 411853  410121  153594  174502  62825 
Robust standard errors in brackets * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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IX. Concluding remarks 
The purpose of this paper was to provide an empirical assessment of the impact that the EU GSP 
exerts on the exports of those developing countries that are eligible for this preferential 
treatment.  
The literature which has investigated the effectiveness of the EU GSP concludes that this 
preferential trade agreement does not achieve its objectives in terms of enhancing the export 
flows of beneficiaries towards EU markets. This is due to the magnitude of the granted margin of 
preference as well as to the high administrative costs, the restrictive RoO, and other conditions 
which undermine the potential of the preferential treatment. 
While research on the EU GSP has focused mainly on its impact on total trade by using 
the dummy variable model to measure the extent of the preferential treatment, assessment of the 
trade effects brought about by the GSP has been rarely made by referring to sectoral data or by 
exploiting data on tariffs which would allow us to gauge the margin of preferences enjoyed by 
developing countries precisely.  
Our work aims to contribute to this literature by providing further evidence based on 
HS6-digit agricultural products and introducing into the estimations a quantitative measure for 
five different trade agreements: the ordinary GSP, GSP-Drug , EBA, Cotonou Agreement, and 
European Mediterranean Agreement. Furthermore, besides standard estimators (OLS and 
LSDV), we employed the Poisson, the NRB and ZIP procedures, in order to cope with the 
existence of many zero trade values in trade statistics. 
The analysis was carried out by considering a large sample of agricultural exports from 
169 exporting countries to the EU over the period 2001-2004. The sample of products is 
comprised of 763 agricultural goods. 
The main findings of our analysis may be summarised as follows. There is evidence that 
the EU GSP has a positive and significant impact on the agricultural exports of preferred 
countries. This evidence is quite robust, being confirmed in all the regressions we estimated by 
pooling the data of agricultural exports and using very different techniques. Yet, although 
positive effects were recorded in the case of EBA and EuroMed agreements, the findings on the 
role of GSP-Drug  and the ACP were puzzling. After replacing the margins of preference for 
each agreement with an index meant to capture the overall effect of EU preferential trade policy, 
we can argue that the entire system of EU trade preferences is beneficial to countries eligible of 
GSP preferential treatment.. Although the evidence at sectoral level is much more mixed that 
that obtained when pooling the data, the impact of the ordinary GSP is positive for many 
agricultural sectors suggesting that the EU trade preferences actually help beneficiary countries 
to increase their exports.       29 
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The list of exporting countries included in the analysis 
GSP: Albania (AL), Andorra (AD), Anguilla (AI), Argentina (AR), Armenia (AM), Aruba (AW), Azerbaijan (AZ), 
Bahrain (BH), Belarus (BY), Bermuda (BM),  Bosnia and Herzegovina (BA), Brazil (BR), British Indian Territory 
(IO),  
Brunei Darussalam (BN), Bulgaria (BG), Cayman Islands (KY), Chile (CL), China, People's Republic of (CN), 
Christmas Island (CX), Cocos Islands or Keeling Islands (CC), Cook Islands (CK), Croatia (HR), Cuba (CU), 
Democratic Republic of Korea(KP), Falklands Islands  (FK), Republic of Korea (KR), Faeroe Islands (FO), French 
Polynesia (PF), French Southern territories (TF), Gibraltar (GI),Greenland (GL), India (IN), Indonesia (ID),  Iran, 
Islamic Republic of (IR), Iraq (IQ),Kazakhstan (KZ), Kuwait (KW),  Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (LY), Malaysia (MY), 
Mayotte (YT), Mexico (MX), Micronesia, Federated States of (FM), Montserrat (MS), Netherlands Antilles (AN), 
New-Caledonia (NC), Norfolk Island  (NF), Northern Mariana Islands (MP), Oman (OM), Pakistan (PK), Palau 
(PW), Paraguay (PY), Philippines (PH), Pitcairn (PN), Qatar (QA), Romania (), Russian Federation (RU), Santa 
Helena (SH), Saudi Arabia (SA), Singapore (SG), South Africa (ZA), South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands 
(GS), Tajikistan (TJ), Thailand (TH), Tokelau (TK), Turkmenistan (TM), Turks and Caicos Islands (TC), Uganda 
(UG), United Arab Emirates (AE), United States Minor outlying Islands (UM), Uruguay (UY), Uzbekistan (UZ), 
Wallis and Futuna (WF),  
 
ACP: Antigua and Barbuda (AG), Bahamas (BS), Barbados (BB) ,Belize (BZ), Botswana (BW), Cook Islands 
(CK), Cameroon (CM), Côte d'Ivoire (CI), Dominica (DM), Dominican Republic (DO), Fiji (FJ), Gabon (GA), 
Grenada (GD), Ghana (GH), Grenada (GD), Republic of Guinea (GN), Guyana (GY), Jamaica (JM), Kenya (KE), 
Marshall Islands (MH), Mauritius (MU), Namibia (MA), Nauru (NR), Nicaragua (NI),Nigeria (NG), Niue (NU), 
Papua New Guinea (PG), St. Kitts and Nevis (KN), St. Lucia (LC), St. Vincent and the Grenadines (VC), Seychelles 
(SC), Suriname (SR), Swaziland (SZ), Tonga (TO), Trinidad and Tobago (TT), Tuvalu (TV), Zimbabwe (ZW).  
 
GSP-Drug
11: Bolivia (BO), Colombia (CO), Costa Rica (CR), Ecuador (EC), Georgia (GE), Guatemala (GT), 
Honduras (HN), Sri Lanka (LK), Moldova, Republic of (MD), Mongolia (MN), Nicaragua (NI), Panama (PA), Peru 
(PE), El Salvador (SV), Venezuela (VE). 
 
EBA: Afghanistan (AF), Angola (AO), Bangladesh (BD), Burkina Faso (BF), Burundi (BI), Benin (BJ), Bhutan 
(BT), Congo, Democratic Republic of (CD), Central African Republic (CF), Cape Verde (CV), Djibouti (DJ), 
Eritrea (ER), Ethiopia  (ET), Gambia (GM), Guinea (GN), Equatorial Guinea (GQ), Guinea-Bissau (GW), Haiti  
(HT), Cambodia (KH), Kiribati (KI), Comoros (KM), Laos People's Democratic Republic (LA), Liberia (LR), 
Lesotho (LS), Madagascar  (MG), Mali (ML), Myanmar (MM), Mauritania (MR), Maldives (MV), Malawi (MW), 
Mozambique (MZ), Niger (NE), Nepal (NP), Rwanda (RW), Solomon Islands (SB), Sudan (SD), Sierra Leone (SL), 
Senegal (SN), Somalia (SO), São Tomé and Príncipe (ST), Chad (TD), Togo (TG), Timor-Leste (TL), Tuvalu (TV), 
Tanzania, United Republic of (TZ), Uganda (UG), Vanuatu (VU), Samoa (WS), Yemen (YE), Zambia (ZM). 
 
EuroMed: Algeria (DZ), Cyprus (CY), Egypt (EG), Israel (IL), Jordan (JO), Lebanon (LB), Malta (MT), Morocco 
(MA), Palestinian Territory, occupied (PS), Syria (SY), Tunisia (TN), Turkey (TR). 
 
 
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES  USA (US), Norway (NO) Japan (JP), New Zealand (NZ) Australia (AU), Canada 





                                                 
11 COMMISSION DECISION of 21st December, 2005 regarding the list of beneficiary countries which 
qualify for the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance, 
provided for by Article 26(e) of Council Regulation (EC) No 980/2005 which applied a scheme of 
generalised tariff preferences (2005/924/EC). Moldova and Sri Lanka were added to the list while 
Pakistan was removed. 







To build the final database needed to estimate the equation (1), we use four different data 
sources, UN COMTRADE, MACMAP, WBDI and DBTAR. COMTRADE is a dataset on trade 
flows provided by the United Nations Trade Database (available at 
http://unstat.un.org/unsd/comtrade/). It is used to gather data regarding the imports of each EU-
15 country in terms of products and exporting countries. Commodities are classified according to 
different international classifications. We use net imports for the EU15 members at HS 6 digit 
level. We consider imports rather than total trade flows (imports+exports), because total trade is 
used to measure the impact of PTAs when there is a mutual reduction in tariffs. Since the EU 
GSP scheme is non-reciprocal, the use of import data is more appropriate. Moreover imports 
rather than exports are used as a dependent variable because imports are much more reliable, as 
it is easier to check for incoming flows of goods. Gross Domestic Product and the Population, 
are from the World Bank Development Indicators (WDI) http://www.worldbank.org/data. 
Distance and dummy variables are drawn from MAcMap, a database developed by the Centre 
d’Etuds Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales (CEPII) and UNCATD. It is available at  
http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/macmap/form_macmap/access.asp, and provides information 
on tariffs applied at the tariff level, distance and other variables by 165 countries. Geographical 
distance is used as a proxy for transport costs. Distance is often a measure of “remoteness”; 
moreover, this is complemented with additional regressors capturing other country pair specific 
trade costs. A set of dummy variables are included in the model (Contiguity, Colony, and 
Common Language) affecting bilateral trade. Tariffs come from DBTAR, which is a database on 
European Agricultural tariffs providing applied tariffs for products over the period 2001-2004. 
The main source of this database is TARIC (Integrated Tariff of the European Community - 
TARIC contains about 15.000 tariff lines). In DBTAR, specific or complex duties are 
transformed into ad-valorem equivalents (AVE) by using an estimation of unit values based on 
EU import statistics from COMEXT database.  DBTAR provides complete information on EU 
tariffs at a very detailed level, including the tariffs applied within each preferential agreement for 
each product. Ad valorem tariff equivalents are also included. 
 